Abstract. Lots of revocable group signature schemes have been proposed so far. In one type of revocable schemes, signing and/or verifying algorithms have O(N ) or O(R) complexity, where N is the group size and R is the number of revoked members. On the other hand, in CamenischLysyanskaya scheme and the followers, signing and verifying algorithms have O(1) complexity. However, before signing, updates of the secret key are required. The complexity is O(R) in the worst case. In this paper, we propose a revocable scheme with signing and verifying of O(1) complexity, where no updates of secret key are required. The compensation is the long public key of O(N ). In addition, we extend it to the scheme with O( √ N )-size public key, where signing and verifying have constant extra costs.
Introduction
Group signatures [15] allow a signer to sign a message anonymously as a group member, while only a designated trusted party can identify the signer from the signature. The group is managed by a group manager (GM ) who permits a user to join the group. For simplicity, this paper assumes that GM is also the trusted party to identify the signer (This assumption can be easily relaxed). The applications of group signatures include anonymous credentials, direct anonymous attestations, and ID management reported in [13, 11, 20] .
Toward making the group signatures practicable, Boneh et al. have proposed a short group signature scheme based on pairings [7] , where signatures are shorter than existing RSA-based group signature schemes. With the advance of the implementations of pairings (e.g., [3, 19] ), we can obtain the implementations of the signing/verifying of the group signatures with practical computation times and data sizes, if the revocation is neglected. The revocation means that the membership of a group member can be easily revoked to exclude the member from the group.
Lots of revocable group signature schemes have been proposed so far (e.g, [10, 14, 24, 7, 8, 12] ). However, one type of schemes [10, 24, 8] has a disadvantage: Singing and/or verifying have the computational complexity (exponentiations or pairings) of O(N ) or O(R), where N is the group size and R is the number of revoked members. Thus, these schemes are not suitable for large and dynamic groups.
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya proposed an elegant revocable scheme [14] using dynamic accumulators. In this scheme, the complexity of signing/verifying is O(1) w.r.t. N and R. However, the disadvantage of this scheme is that, whenever making a signature, the signer has to modify his secret key. The modification requires some data of joining and removed members since the last time he signed. This implies that a signer requires a computation of O(N ). This is relaxed into O(R) in [12, 7] . However, since R becomes large in large and dynamic groups, we should explore another approach for signing/verifying with O(1) costs.
Another RSA-based approach without the key update is proposed in [23] . In the approach, the large group is partitioned to sub-groups, and the scheme of [24] is utilized for each smaller sub-groups. The scheme of [24] achieves O(1) exponentiations on signing/verifying for middle-scale sub-groups with less than about 1000 members. The computational cost on partitioning in [23] is also O (1) . Thus, this approach achieves signing/verifying with O(1) costs. However, this approach has a weakness for larger groups; The signer has to obtain public data reflecting the current membership situation for each member, but the size of the data is O(N ). Namely, the signer has to fetch the data with O(N ) size whenever signing. Another problem is that it is based on RSA, and thus the long RSA modulus leads to long signatures and revocation data. Therefore, for larger groups, the communication cost becomes vast.
Our contributions. In this paper, we propose a pairing-based revocable scheme satisfying 1. signing/verifying requires only O(1) computational costs, 2. any update of member's secret key is not required, and 3. data related to revocation, which is fetched by the signer, has O(R) size.
Therefore, signing/verifying is sufficiently fast even for larger or dynamic groups, while the communication does not cause large delay.
On the other hand, the compensation is the long public key with O(N ) size. In general applications (e.g., authentications for Web services), the public key is distributed once in joining, together with the software of the applications. Thus, the compensation is not so serious. However, for millions of members, the long time of downloading may disgust users. To solve this, in this paper, we also propose an extended scheme with O( √ N )-size public key, where signing/verifying has constant extra costs.
The reduction to the O( √ N ) size means the sufficient practicality of our schemes for large groups. In case of the 112-bit security level and N = 1, 000, 000, the public key size of the extended scheme is less than 100 KBytes. This size shows the sufficient practicality of the storage, not only in usual PCs but also in smart phones. Furthermore, since clients have only to download the public key once, the communication cost does not matter.
We can consider a trivial revocation method, where a non-revoked member fetches a new secret key whenever revocation happens or a time interval proceeds.
To fetch it anonymously, the signer has to fetch the keys of whole non-revoked members. This means fetching O(N )-size data. In our scheme, the fetched data is reduced to O(R) size.
The signer's fetching O(R)-size date is a concern for the realization of group signatures. However, except the VLR (Verifier-Local Revocation) method [8] , every revocation mechanism such as [10, 14, 7, 12, 24] needs such a communication cost. Note that the VLR mechanism requires O(R) computational cost in the verification. Thus, we consider that our revocation method is currently better than the other methods in the natural situation that the signer can use a broadband channel. The reduction in the fetched data is an open problem.
Related works. One of trends in researches on group signatures is to exclude the random oracle model. From the viewpoint of both efficiency and security, Groth's scheme [18] is currently the best choice. Although this scheme achieves the constant length of signatures, it still is greatly less efficient than efficient schemes [7, 16] in the random oracle model. Since our aim is the realization of group signatures in practical applications, we adopt the efficient underlying scheme [16] to add our novel revocation mechanism. This means that our scheme is secure in the random oracle model. A construction without the random oracle is one of our future works.
Model and Security Definitions
We show a model of revocable group signature scheme. This model and the following security requirements are derived from [8, 5] . Mainly, for the simplicity, we construct our model on the basis of the model of [8] . The differences from [8] are the revocation mechanism, Join algorithm (and non-frameability), and Open algorithm. In [8] , Verify algorithm is given revocation list RL t , but in our model, Sign algorithm is given RL t . We consider that the non-frameability (i.e., preventing GM from forging a member's signature) is important, and thus, add Join algorithm and the definition of the non-frameability, based on [5] . Also, the Open algorithm is added for the purpose of identifying an illegal member.
Revocable group signature scheme consists of the following algorithms: The security requirements, Traceability, Anonymity, and Non-frameability, are defined as follows.
Traceability
The following traceability requirement captures the unforgeability and the revocability of group signatures. Consider the following traceability game between an adversary A and a challenger, where A tries to forge a signature that cannot be traced to one of members corrupted by A or to forge a signature that is traced to a revoked member corrupted by A. Traceability requires that for all PPT A, the probability that A wins the traceability game is negligible.
Setup

Anonymity
The following anonymity requirement captures the anonymity and unlinkability of signatures. Consider the following anonymity game.
Setup:
The challenger runs KeyGen, and obtains gpk and msk. He provides A with gpk, and run A. He sets t = 0 and RU and CU with empty. Queries: A can query the challenger. The available queries are the same ones as in the traceability game. Challenge: A outputs a message M and two members i 0 and i 1 . If i 0 / ∈ CU and i 1 / ∈ CU , the challenger chooses φ ∈ R {0, 1}, and responds the signature on M of member i φ using the current RL t . Restricted queries: Similarly, A can make the queries. However, A cannot query opening of the signature responded in the challenge. Output: Finally, A outputs a bit φ indicating its guess of φ.
Anonymity requires that for all PPT A, the advantage of A on the anonymity game is negligible.
Non-frameability
This property requires that a signature of an honest member cannot be computed by other members and even GM .
Consider the following non-frameability game.
Setup:
The challenger uses Setup to obtain param, and sets t = 0 and RU and HU with empty, where HU denotes the set of IDs of honest users who are not corrupted by A. Then, run A on param, who initially outputs gpk. Queries: After the key output in the run, A issues the following queries to the challenger. Join: A can request the i-th honest user's join. Then, A as GM executes the join protocol with the challenger as the i-the user. The challenger adds i to HU . Revocation: A can request the revocation of member i. The challenger increases t by 1, add i to RU , and responds RL t for t and RU . Sign: A can request a signature on message M for user's ID i using the current RL t . Non-Frameability requires that for all PPT A, the probability that A wins the non-frameability game is negligible.
Preliminaries
Bilinear Groups
Our scheme utilizes bilinear groups and bilinear maps as follows:
1. G, H and T are multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p, 2. g and h are randomly chosen generators of G and H, respectively.
e is an efficiently computable bilinear map: G ×H → T , i.e., (1) for all u, u ∈ G and v, v ∈ H, e(uu , v) = e(u, v)e(u , v) and e(u, vv ) = e(u, v)e(u, v ), and thus for all
We can set G = H, but we allow G = H for the generality. Thus, our scheme can be implemented on both supersingular curves and ordinary curves. The bilinear map can be efficiently implemented with the Tate pairing (or the η T pairing [3] on supersingular curves or the Ate pairing [19] on ordinary curves).
Assumptions
Our schemes are based on the q-SDH assumption [7, 8] on G. Furthermore, our schemes adopt the tracing mechanism of [16] , where, in addition to the bilinear groups, another group F with the same order p and the DDH assumption is required.
Definition 1 (q-SDH assumption). For all PPT algorithm A , the probability
is negligible, where u ∈ R G and a ∈ R Z p .
Definition 2 (DDH assumption). For all PPT algorithm A, the probability
Based on the q-SDH assumption, the DL (Discrete Logarithm) assumption also holds.
Definition 3 (DL assumption). For all PPT algorithm A, the probability
BB Signatures
Our group signature schemes utilize Boneh-Boyen (BB) signature scheme [6] . As shown in [7] , the knowledge of this signature (and the message) can be proved by a zero-knowledge proof for a representation, which is shown in Sec. 3.5. BB signatures are existentially unforgeable against weak chosen message attack under the q-SDH assumption [6] . In this attack, the adversary must choose messages queried for the oracle, before the public key is given.
BB-Setup
BBS+ Signatures
This signature scheme is an extension from BB signature scheme, and is informally introduced in [7] , and the concrete construction is shown in [16, 1] . We call this signature BBS+ signature, as well as [1] . This scheme allows us to sign a set of messages. Also, the knowledge of the signature and messages can be proved [16, 1] , as well as BB signatures.
BBS+-Setup: Select bilinear groups G, H, T with a prime order p and a bilin
The secret key is X and the public key is (p,
The signature is (A, y, z). BBS+-Verify: Given messages m 1 , . . . , m L and the signature (A, y, z), check
BBS+ signatures are existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen message attack under the q-SDH assumption [2] .
Proving Relations on Representations
As well as [7, 8, 16] , we adopt signatures converted by Fiat-Shamir heuristic (using a hash function) from zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (P K), where a signer can convince a verifier of knowledge with relations on representations. We call the signatures SP Ks. The SP Ks we adopt are the generalization of the Schnorr signature. We introduce the following notation.
which means a signature of message M by a signer who knows secret values x 1 , . . . , x t satisfying a relation R(x 1 , . . . , x t ). In this paper, the following SP Ks on G, T , F are utilized.
SP K of representation:
An SP K proving the knowledge of a representation of C ∈ G to the bases g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g t ∈ G on message M is denoted as
This can be also constructed on groups T , F. SP K of representations with equal parts: An SP K proving the knowledge of representations of C, C ∈ G to the bases g 1 , . . . , g t ∈ G on message M , where the representations include equal values as parts, is denoted as 
where C, g 1 , . . . , g t ∈ G and C , h 1 , . . . , h t ∈ T .
In the random oracle model, the SP K can be simulated without the knowledge using a simulator in the zero-knowledge-ness of the underlying P K. Moreover, the SP K has an extractor of the proved secret knowledge given two accepting protocol views whose commitments are the same and whose challenges are different.
Proposed Scheme
Idea
The mechanism of conventional (non-revocable) group signature schemes is informally as follows. When a member joins, the member sends f (x) to GM , where f is a one-way function and x is a secret. GM returns a membership certificate S = Sign(x) to the member, where Sign is a signing function of GM . Then, the group signature consists of E = Enc(f (x)), where Enc is an encryption function using the manager's public key, and the following SP K on the signed message M .
SP K{(x, S)
When opening the group signature, the manager decrypts E to check the sender of f (x) in joining.
We borrow this mechanism from the Furukawa-Imai scheme [16] , which is the one improved on the efficiency from [7] and currently is the most efficient pairing-based scheme. To this component, we add a novel revocation mechanism for realizing the constant computational complexity in signing/verifying.
The membership certificate in our scheme is modified to S = Sign(x, U ID), where U ID is the ID of the member. On the other hand, a revocation list RL t consists of (Sign(t, RID 0 , RID 1 ), . . . , Sign(t, RID r , RID r+1 )).
is the U ID of a revoked member. Then, we can assume that RID i is sorted such that RID i < RID i+1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r. In addition, RID 0 and RID r+1 are special IDs, where RID 0 < U ID and RID r+1 > U ID for any U ID.
The group signature for RL t is the following SP K.
SP K{(x, U ID, S, RID
Clearly any non-revoked member can prove this SP K. On the other hand, if the member with U ID is revoked, U ID = RIDĩ holds for someĩ. Then, RID i < U ID holds for all i <ĩ, and U ID < RID i for all i >ĩ. Thus, the revoked member cannot find i such that RID i < U ID < RID i+1 , which means that the member cannot prove this SP K, since the correctness of U ID, RID i and RID i+1 are also ensured by the certificates S andS at the current time t.
The costs of the SP Ks for inequations have O(1) complexity, as the construction idea of the SP K is shown later. Thus, the computational costs for signing/verifying are O(1) w.r.t. R and N . The size of a signature is also O(1).
The size of RL t is O(R).
The overhead is the revocation complexity of GM , that is, each revocation requires O(R) computation, and the long public key with O(N ) size due to the following SP K for inequations.
Remark 1.
Our novel idea is to use the above integer inequations on U ID and RID's. Instead, we easily get a simple solution of proving that his U ID is not equal to all RID's, but it requires O(R) complexity. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya proposed an elegant idea of the dynamic accumulator [14] , but it needs the incremental update of signer's secret key. On the other hand, in our solution, the signer has only to prove the inequations for some i, and thus has O(1) complexity. And, note that it does not need any update of the secret key. As far as we know, such a solution is unknown, and thus our construction idea has a sufficient novelty together with the practicality on efficiency.
Remark 2. Note that this group signature does not reveal any information on i, RID i and RID i+1 to the verifier. This is because the SP K proves only the fact that there are secrets i, RID i and RID i+1 satisfying the inequations RID i < U ID < RID i+1 , without revealing i, RID i and RID i+1 .
Proving Integer Inequations. In the above construction idea, we need an efficient SP K proving an integer inequation on secrets, as RID i < U ID. In the strong RSA setting, Boudot's SP K [9] can be used. However, this methodology cannot be easily adopted to the pairing-based setting. On the other hand, Teranishi and Sako utilize an SP K [25] proving that a secret is in an integer interval, and the SP K is effective even in the pairing-based setting. We adopt this SP K and extend it to the SP K proving the integer inequation.
At first, we consider the SP K proving that a secret w is in the interval The computational cost of this SP K is constant w.r.t. N , although the distributions of N certificates is an overhead.
Remark 3.
As another approach of the SP K proving the interval relation, a bit-by-bit approach is also known, which is described and used in [1] . However, in this approach, the size of the proof is linear in the size of the secret to be proved. In case of adopting it in our group signatures, the size is log 2 N , and the proof size is about 4 log 2 N multiplied by the size of the group element. If we use the same parameters as Sect. 7 and N = 1, 000, 000, the SP K amounts to more than 2,000 Bytes. Since we use interval proofs two times in our group signatures, the group signature is about more than 4,000 Bytes. Even in case of N = 1, 000, it is more than 2,000 Bytes. On the other hand, our group signature proposed in this section is about 650 Bytes, and our extended group signature proposed in Sect. 6 is about 1,200 Bytes.
In the bit-by-bit approach, the public key size is constant and better. However, signatures frequently occur in authentications or signings, and thus, in lots of applications, the signature size influences the efficiency of communication and storage more than the size of the public key that is not changed. This is why we adopt Teranishi-Sako's SP K proving interval relations in this paper.
Proposed Algorithms
Assume that the total number of group members, N , is fixed in advance, and we can assume that N < p/2.
Setup:
The input of this algorithm is security parameter 1 , and the output is param.
Select bilinear groups G, H, T with the same prime order p of length , and
the bilinear map e. In addition, select a group F with the DDH assumption and the same prime order p. Select hash function H : {0, 
Join: This is an interactive protocol between Join-U (the i-th joining user) and Join-GM (GM ). The common input is gpk, and the input of Join-GM is msk.
The output of Join-U is usk[i]. The output is Join-GM is reg[i]
. Assume that i = 1 and i = N are assigned to fictitious users out of the group (Assume that the users of i = 1, N are always revoked). Revoke: The input of this algorithm consists of gpk, t and RU . The output is RL t .
1. Sort elements of RU , according to ascending order. Letî 1 , . . . ,î r be the sorted ones, where r = |RU |. In addition, setî
Sign: The input of this algorithm consists of gpk,
The output is σ. 
Select a random α ∈ R Z p , and compute a commitment
As indicated in Lemma 1, the above relations in V ensure the validity of signatures (A i , y i , z i ), (Bî j ,ŷ j ,ẑ j ), F δ1 , F δ2 and the validity of T 1 , T 2 and T 3 , respectively.
Verify: The inputs are gpk, t, a target signature σ = (C,Ĉ,
, and the message M . Check the SP K V . Output 'valid' (resp., 'invalid') if it is correct (resp., incorrect).
Open:
The inputs are gpk, the secret key msk = (X,X,X, X 1 , X 2 ), reg with
Security
Here, we show a lemma and theorems on the security of our scheme.
This proof will be in the full paper. Note that F δ1 and F δ2 are variants of BB signatures, and are not the same as F δ1 and F δ2 , due to the partsg
However, in the traceability game, the difference can be treated well. Note that, as well as [21] , the adopted SP Ks of F δ1 and F δ2 are more efficient than those of F δ1 and F δ2 described in [7] . This proof will be in the full paper. In the proof, if an adversary wins the traceability game for our scheme, using this adversary, we can forge BBS+ signatures (A i , y i , z i ) or (Bî j ,ŷ j ,ẑ j ), or a BB signature F k . Thus, we can construct adversaries for the BBS+ signatures or BB+ signatures, which are secure under the q-SDH assumption.
Theorem 2. The proposed scheme satisfies the anonymity under the DDH assumption, in the random oracle model.
This proof is similar to [17] , which is the full-paper version of [16] . As well as [16] , our group signature consists of a double encryption of an ID f xi , (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ), and the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof including statistically hiding commitments, which mean an IND-CCA2 secure encryption. Thus, easily we can reduce the anonymity game of our scheme to the IND-CCA2 game for the IND-CCA2 secure encryption under the DDH assumption.
Theorem 3. The proposed scheme satisfies the non-frameability under the DL assumption, in the random oracle model.
This proof is also similar to [17] . In this proof, the DL adversary is constructed using the adversary in the non-frameability game. In the game, instead of computing (f, f xi ), the input of the DL adversary is used as (f, f xi ). In an honest user's joining, f xi in the input (x i is unknown) is used. The SP Ks for x i in joining and signing can be simulated by the zero-knowledge simulator. From the output of the adversary in the non-frameability game (which outputs the signature for the honest user with x i with a non-negligible probability), we can extract x i , which means breaking the DL assumption.
Extension
The weak point of the proposed scheme is O(N ) size of gpk. This section shows an extended scheme with O( √ N )-size public key.
Idea
The extension is obtained by improving the SP K proving integer inequation. A positive integer w ∈ [1, N ] can be expressed as w On the other hand, the number of the issued certificates is O( √ N ), which means O( √ N )-size public key.
Extended Algorithms
Define N 1 = √ N and N 2 = 2 √ N . We assume that N 2 1 +N 2 < p/2. Revoke, Verify, and Open are similar to the basic scheme in Sec. 4. The others are modified as follows.
Setup:
In addition to Setup of the basic scheme, selectġ,ġ 1 ∈ G,ḣ ∈ H, which are added to param.
KeyGen: In addition to Step 1 and 2 of KeyGen of the basic scheme, selecṫ X ∈ R Z p , and computeẎ =ḣẊ .
Step 3 is modified as follows.
3. For all j ∈ 1, . . . , N 
Sign:
Step 1, 2, 4 are the same as the basic scheme.
Step 3, 5 are modified as follows.
Security. The proof sketch of the traceability will also be in the full paper, which is similar to the proof of the basic scheme. The anonymity and non-frameability can be proved as well as the basic scheme.
Efficiency
Computational efficiency. At first, we discuss the efficiency of the basic scheme in Sec. 4. As well as [22] , all pairings in the Sign algorithm can be pre-computed, and pairings except 4 pairing in the Verify algorithm can be also pre-computed. Then, the Sign algorithm requires 4 exponentiations on G, 6 exponentiations on F, and 4 multi-exponentiations on T . The Verify algorithm requires 3 exponentiations on F, 4 multi-exponentiations on H, 4 multi-exponentiations on T , and 4 pairings. The computational time of each exponentiation or each pairing does not depend on N and R, and thus constant computational costs for both Sign and Verify are achieved. The next is the efficiency of the extended scheme in Sec. 6. By adopting the same pre-computations, the Sign algorithm requires 16 multi-exponentiations on G, 6 exponentiations on F, and 6 multi-exponentiations on T . The Verify algorithm requires 6 multi-exponentiations on G, 3 exponentiations on F, 6 multiexponentiations on H, 6 multi-exponentiations on T , and 6 pairings. Thus, we achieve O(1) computational costs in signing/verifying in both schemes, although the extended one has some overheads for obtaining O( √ N )-size public key.
Data size. Here, we discuss the data size. To confirm the practicality, we use the following concrete parameters. To obtain the 112-bit security level, we can represent G-and F-elements with 224 bits for the ECC DL security. We assume the BN curves [4] with efficient pairing computations and the embedding degree 12. Then, we can represent T -elements with 2688 bits, which satisfies the DL security corresponding the 112-bit security level. Note that both schemes have signatures with constant sizes. In the above concrete setting, the signature of the basic scheme is about 650 Bytes. This is because the signature σ has 4 G-elements, 3 F-elements, and 16 Z p -elements. On the other hand, the signature of the extended scheme is about 1,200 Bytes, since the signature has 10 G-elements, 3 F-elements, and 30 Z p -elements.
Next, we discuss the public key size. In the basic scheme, the length of gpk is O(N ), due to the dominant F 1 , . . . , F N . On the other hand, in the extended one, it is reduced to O( √ N ), due to the dominant F 1 , . . . , F N1 ,Ḟ 0 , . . . ,Ḟ N2 . To confirm the practicality of the extended one, we also use the above concrete parameters. Then, in case of N = 1, 000, 000, the public parameters F 1 , . . . , F N1 ,Ḟ 0 , . . ., F N2 only need about 84 KBytes in total. This concrete size shows the sufficient practicality of the storage, not only in usual PCs but also in smart phones. Furthermore, since clients have only to download the public key once, the communication cost does not matter.
As the final remark, in both schemes, the length of RL t is O(R).
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed revocable group signature schemes, where both signing and verifying require only constant computational costs w.r.t. the group size and the number of revoked members. In the schemes, any secret key update is not required, and the data related to revocation has O(R) size. One of our future works is to integrate this scheme into anonymous client authentications in WEB services, and to evaluate it in practical environments. Other future works are to decrease the size of the revocation list and to exclude the random oracle.
